Чой Док-Cу (Choi, Deok-Soo),
Университет Кореи, Сеул
This study analyzes Koreans’ perception of Russia during the latter period of the 19th century. It is a well-known fact that the growing threat of Western imperialism from the middle of the 19th century onwards spurred Korea to pursue the reform of its traditional ruling structure internally, while at the same time, adopting an independent course toward the outside world. Nevertheless, with the completion of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 serving as the impetus, Korea soon found itself becoming a protectorate of Japan, and eventually falling under the Japanese colonial yoke.
This study consist of two sections: The first analyzes Koreans’ perception of Russia from the first encounter between the two countries along their mutual border in 1860, up to the establishment of official diplomatic relations in 1884. This was a period which saw Koreans first contacts with Western powers, and one which became the basis for the prototypical modern Korean perception of the world. The second section analyzes Koreans’ perception of Russia during the period spanning from the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 to the onset of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904; namely, the period in which the traditional Sino-centric order in East Asia was abandoned in favor of the modern international order. From that period onwards, Russia exercised a powerful influence on various aspects of Korean life, including its politics and diplomacy.
As a means of countering Japan’s growing encroachment on the Korean peninsula in the aftermath of Tokyo’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War, King Kojong of Chosŏn secretly sought refuge in the Russian Legation ten months after the cessation of hostilities. This incident got known in Korean history as the Agwan p’ach’ŏn (俄館播遷, King Kojong’s Flight to the Russian Legation). Upon his return to the palace following his one-year sojourn in the Russian Legation, during which time he continued to oversee the affairs of the state. The primary task of Kojong became the transforming of Chosŏn into an imperial state (Taehan Empire), a move that would on the surface place Korea on an equal footing with China and Japan. The active implementation of government-led reforms during the decade that followed would result in the rapid dismantlement of the Korean traditional ruling structure.
By focusing on Koreans’ perception of Russia, this study will try to analyze the formation and changes in Korean intellectuals’ perception of the world during this period in which the traditional East Asian Sino-centric perception of the world first encountered the modern perception of the world order. The political groups and figures which can be regarded as representative torwards the changes in Korean’s perceptions of the international order which took place during each of the periods under study form the main focus of this paper. Moreover this study made use of documents related to the traditional literati class and bureaucracy of Chosŏn, as well as to the intellectuals influenced by Western culture who first appeared during this period.
In the second section, two historical docu ments, the Chosŏn ch’aengnyak (朝鮮策略, Ch’ao-hsien t’se-lüeh, A policy for Korea) and the Maninso (萬人疏, literally ten-thousand persons’ memorial, this was in fact a memorial used as a form of protest by Confucian scholars during the Chosŏn dynasty) are used to analyze Koreans’ perceptions during the relevant periods. At the beginning of the 1880s, Korean society was in the throes of a continuous debate that pitted a government in favor of opening up to the West against traditional Confucian intellectuals who vehemently opposed such a step. The Chosŏn ch’aengnyak, which was written by Huang Tsun-hsien, a diplomat in the Chinese Legation in Japan, was commissioned by a Qing government that had traditionally played the role of Chosŏn’s diplomatic sponsor, and can be regarded as having been representative of the position of the Chosŏn government during this period. Conversely, the Maninso written by Confucian intellectuals from the Yŏngnam area in 1881 stands out as the preeminent document in terms of displaying the Confucian intellectuals’ traditional Chosŏn-style perception of the international order.
The analysis developed in the third section mainly revolves around Min Yŏnghwan (1861-1905), who can be regarded as a leading proponent of the demands which emerged within the bureaucracy for the reform of the government during the period of growing Western encroachment, including that of Russia and the United States, in Chosŏn’s affairs after the Sino-Japanese War, and on the Tongnip sinmun (The Independent), a newspaper which exercised great influence over Korean public opinion. These attempts to analyze the perception of the international order occupied by those who belonged to the main political forces involved in the implementation of an opening policy within a Korean society. Until to the 1880’s the East Asian state remained most hermetically sealed from the West, will contribute to the development of a better understanding of the prototypical Korean perception of the world which exists today.
The Russo-Korean Treaty of 1884 and Koreans’ Perception of Russia.
The middle of the 19th century was a period in which Western capitalist powers used their military might to force East Asian nations to open up their markets to the outside world. Thus, while the Qing dynasty was compelled to open up its domestic markets by the 1842 Anglo-Chinese Treaty of Nanking that effectively brought to an end the so-called ‘Opium War’, Japan suffered a similar fate after having been forced by the U.S. in 1854 to sign the Treaty of Peace and Amity (Convention of Kanagawa). The first Western demand for Chosŏn to open its doors came from a vessel which belonged to the British East India Company, the Lord Amherst, in 1832. This initial demand in 1832 came at a time when the British government had revoked the British East India Company’s exclusive trade rights in China in favor of a more hands on approach to the opening up of the Chinese market.
These facts would seem to prove that Chosŏn was regarded by Western powers such as England as a target, along with Japan and China, of their efforts to gain access to East Asian domestic markets. From the 1860s onwards, a period in which the first border contacts between Russia and Chosŏn took place, Western powers such as France and the United States followed the precedent set in the Chinese and Japanese cases, and attempted to use gunboat diplomacy to pry Chosŏn’s doors open. The need to uncover the facts behind the murder of French Jesuit priests served as the justification for France’s initial attempts to encroach on Chosŏn. Meanwhile, the United States claimed that its skirmishes with Chosŏn had been prompted by its desire to investigate the facts behind the destruction of the General Sherman at the hands of Chosŏn residents.
The year 1871 saw the United States conquer the militarily strategic Kwanghwa Island that lies only 50 km from Seoul with 6 gunboats and a ground force composed of 1,300 marines. This military expedition against Chosŏn, which represented the largest overseas American military venture since the Civil War, was launched after months of intense training for such an undertaking in Nagasaki, Japan. Faced with the advanced weaponry of the Americans, Chosŏn suffered greatly in terms of the dead and wounded during this battle. However, much to the U.S. surprise, Chosŏn continued to refuse to open its doors. On the contrary, having realized the absolute military power of these merchants of Western capitalism, the government of Chosŏn soon set about making it clear to its public that it remained firmly against any opening up of the state. In this vein, Chosŏn erected monuments which contained inscriptions calling for opposition to any peace negotiations with the Western powers in every village around the nation. The inscription found on these monuments read as follows: ‘Western barbarians foully attack! Should we not fight, accord must be made! To urge accord is to betray the country! (洋夷侵犯 非戰則和 主和賣國). The continued strict adherence to the maxim found on these monuments meant that by the middle of the 1870’s Chosŏn remained the only area in East Asia which still lay outside of the sphere of the global capitalist market.
As such, although the Western powers began to more or less simultaneously pressure Chosŏn, China, and Japan to open their doors, the eventual opening up of Chosŏn to Western powers unfolded in a manner unlike what transpired in China or Japan. While the battles with the U.S. and France did little to alter Korea’s fierce opposition to any opening up of the country, the situation began to somewhat change following the signing of the Kanghwa Treaty with Japan in 1876. However, by and large, Chosŏn maintained its antagonistic stance towards the Western powers even after having concluded the above-mentioned treaty with Japan and having allowed some trade to take place. Such a denouncement was unlike what unfolded in China and Japan, who after having respectively signed initial treaties with England and the U.S. in 1842 and 1854, proceeded to conclude similar treaties with other Western nations in rapid succession. In the Korean case, some six years would pass before the signing of the United States-Korea Treaty could take place in 1882. However, the subsequent conclusion of the Anglo-Korean Treaty in 1883 and the Russo-Korean Treaty in 1884 meant that the globalization of the hermit nation[1] known as Korea was now complete.[2]
Chosŏn’s opening to the Western world, which picked up steam in the 1880s, created various opportunities to change the existing power structure. This turn of events was in large part the result of the all-out competition between the Western capitalist powers to secure a bridgehead and strengthen their influence in East Asia which raged from the middle of the 19th century onwards. The period from the end of 1880 to 1881 has widely been regarded as that in which Chosŏn’s perception of the world started to change to the point where it began to look favorably on the conclusion of treaties with Western powers and the opening up of its domestic market to the latter. At the beginning of the 1880’s, the diplomatic requests for Chosŏn to open its doors were usually simultaneously conveyed through China and Japan, both of which had until that period played the role of connecting Chosŏn to the outside world.
In June 1880 Chosŏn dispatched government officials led by Kim Hongjip (1842-1896) on an inspection tour of Japan that was designed to ascertain the current state of Western powers’ encroachment in East Asia, as well as to learn more about the international political situation. Kim Hongjip would eventually become a central figure in the efforts to reform the Chosŏn government that occurred in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War. It was during his stay in Japan, when he had the opportunity to exchange information with Japanese officials and to come into contact with Chinese diplomats stationed in Japan- Kim began to chart out a course for Chosŏn’s own reform and opening policies.
Huang Tsun-hsien, a diplomat stationed in the Chinese Legation in Japan who was widely perceived as the point man within the Li Hungchang government on Japanese domestic policy, gave Kim a copy of his book entitled <Ch’ao-hsien t’se-lüeh (朝鮮策略) > which dealt with the future direction which Chosŏn’s foreign policy should follow. In the conclusion of the <Ch’ao-hsien t’se-lüeh>, Huang summarized the future direction of Chosŏn’s foreign policy, which he regarded as being closely related to the state of Western encroachment in East Asia, in the following fashion:
As Chosŏn occupies a strategically important location in Asia, it finds itself in the middle a vigorous competition for its favor involving the major powers. If Chosŏn is thrown into crisis, then the situation will also become precarious in China and Japan. If Russia decides to expand its territory, it will surely start with Chosŏn… Therefore, it is most urgent for Chosŏn to establish a foreign policy that revolves around the forging of a defensive posture against Russia. What kind of strategic scheme could deter Russia from such adventurism? Chosŏn should strengthen its national power, by maintaining a close friendship with China (親中國: Ch΄in Chung-kuo), treaty ties with Japan (結日本: chieh Jih-pen), and a diplomatic alliance with the United States (聯美國: lien Mei-kuo).[3]
The Chinese government, stating the strategic importance of the Korean peninsula in this age of imperialism, identified Russia’s southward expansion policy as the most important threat to the security of the East Asian region. In this regards, the best means for Chosŏn to counter this Russian policy was to secure the support of the United States. As such, China’s policy for Chosŏn can be evaluated as an extension of its own traditional balance of power model that revolved around the ability to deter surrounding powers.
Here it should be noted that the Japanese delegates to the negotiations that eventually resulted in the Kanghwa Treaty of 1876 also emphasized Russia’s expansionist designs as the most important threat to Chosŏn’s independence. As such, during this initial period in which Chosŏn sought to open itself up to the West, powerful forces within China and Japan, both of which had already opened up their domestic markets to the Western powers, emphasized the expansionist nature of Russia’s East Asian policy. For its part, China, evoking the crisis revolving around Russia’s potential invasion of Chosŏn, stressed the need for the latter to establish treaty ties with Japan and to conclude an alliance with the United States.
On top of the specter of Russian encroachment in Chosŏn, the <Ch’ao-hsien t’se-lüeh> argued that there were two other additional reasons that made the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States a necessity. One was that the United States was not the kind of Catholic state so strongly opposed by Chosŏn’s intellectuals, but a Protestant one. The other was that unlike Russia, which constituted a clear and present threat, the geographical distance between the United States and Korea meant that the former desired nothing more than commercial trade with Chosŏn.
Confucian intellectuals in local areas responded to the Chosŏn government’s attempts to pursue an opening policy by taking measures designed to showcase their profound opposition to such a course of action. For instance, intellectuals in Kyŏngsang Province clearly spelled out their vitriolic opposition to such moves in the <Maninso (萬人疏)>. In this document, they criticized the assertions found in the <Ch’ao-hsien t’se-lüeh> as follows:
We have no inherent knowledge of the United States…. We have no reason to despise Russia. If we listen to others and exclude a state which lies in close proximity to ours in the name of diplomatic relations with faraway states, then our actions and responses become incoherent…. Russia, the United States, and Japan are all barbarian states. It is difficult to identify whom amongst these barbarians we should be friendly or inhospitable towards.[4]
The years 1880 and 1881 constituted an important period in terms of Chosŏn society’s decision to accept or refuse the modern capitalist system. While the emergence of a nationwide movement opposed to the opening of the country to the world caused the Chosŏn government to temporarily delay the establishment of diplomatic ties with the United States, such a treaty was eventually signed in 1882, with the opening of its markets taking place soon thereafter. One month after the signing of the treaty with the U.S., Chosŏn concluded a similar treaty with the British.
However, the launching of a successful coup d’etat (Imo Military Revolt) by the conservative forces who had originally opposed the government’s opening policy meant that this treaty with England did not go into effect for some time. The new government which came to power following China’s military intervention to overthrow the conservative coterie accepted the British offer of an amended agreement presented in 1883, and official diplomatic relations were established that same year. The Anglo-Korea Treaty of 1883 was followed in 1884 by a similar treaty with Russia. As such, the first stage of the globalization of Chosŏn had been completed by the second half of the 19th century.
The Establishment of the Taehan Empire in 1896 and Koreans’ Perception of Russia.
The Head of the Russian Legation in Tokyo presented his government’s opposition to Article 1 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki signed on April 23, 1895 which effectively ended the Sino-Japanese War. In this regard, the Russian government advised Japan to abandon its designs on the Liaodong peninsula following its victory of the Sino-Japanese War, as such a move would not only pose a threat to the capital of Qing, but also render Chosŏn independent only in name, thus creating obstacles to the establishment of permanent peace in the Far East. It was Russia’s perception of the outcome of the Sino-Japanese War that led it to launch the so-called ‘Triple Intervention’ along with Germany and France. Suddenly finding itself under intense pressure, the Japanese government had no choice but to acquiesce to the Russian suggestion a week later.[5]
Russia’s diplomatic influence greatly expanded in the Far East as a whole in the aftermath of the Triple Intervention; however, this influence was especially accrued in the case of Chosŏn who began to perceive Russia as the only power capable of countering Japan, whose influence had expanded exponentially following the Sino-Japanese War. The Chosŏn government began to actively pursue a pro-Russian policy, a stance which was also adhered to by the royal family, especially Queen Min. For its part, Japan resorted to extreme measures to restore its suddenly waning influence. The most extreme of these acts involved the Head of the Japanese Legation in Seoul’s active participation in the brutal assassination of Queen Min in 1895.
Anti-Japanese elements within the government soon set about seeking out ways to curb Japanese influence, one of which involved King Kojong’s secret relocation to a foreign legation. On February 11, 1896, this plan was put into action as King Kojong successfully sought refuge in the Russian Legation. This denouement resulted in the collapse of the pro-Japanese government that had been established during the Sino-Japanese War, a turn of events which in turn enjoyed wide support amongst the general population. For the next year or so, King Kojong would rule his country from within the walls of the Russian Legation.
Japan, whose influence was further weakened as a result of the collapse of the pro-Japanese government in Seoul, sought to engage in negotiations with Russia. The first such attempt was the Waeber-Komura Memorandum (May 14, 1896) concluded between the Russian and Japanese Legations in Korea. Shortly thereafter, the Russian and Japanese governments concluded the Robanov-Yamakata Protocol (June 9, 1896) during the latter’s sojourn to Russia to take part in Tsar Nicholas II’s Coronation.
The royal aides who seized the reigns of power during King Kojong’s internment in the Russian Legation, attempted to establish various policies designed to stabilize the basis of the royal authority amidst the ongoing changes wrought to the new international order in East Asia created by the Triple Intervention. To this end, upon his return from the Russian Legation, King Kojong announced the establishment of the Taehan Empire, which on the surface positioned Korea on the same footing as China and Japan. In addition to these external changes in the state structure, the new government also actively pursued reform-oriented policies at home. New individual movements also emerged during this period as well. In this vein, Min Yŏnghwan (1861-1905) and the Tongnip hyŏphoe (獨立協會, The Independence Club) can be identified as the main figure and group at the center of the government and private groups’ efforts to bring about reform.
Min Yŏnghwan’s Perception of Russia.
The Chosŏn government’s decision to dispatch envoys to take part in Tsar Nicholas II’s Coronation conducted in Moscow in May 1896 can be seen as having been conducted as part of Chosŏn’s active campaign to secure the support of Russia. In this regard, Min Yŏnghwan was dispatched to the coronation in his role as extraordinary royal envoy. Given the individual’s influence on the formation of modern Korean nationalism, it can rightfully be said that few studies have been conducted on Min Yŏnghwan. Recent studies conducted abroad have tended to view Min Yŏnghwan as the person who provided the decisive opportunity for Koreans to join forces in defending the national spirit, and who fostered the movements designed to restore the national sovereignty that emerged during the period that immediately preceded Chosŏn’s fall into the yoke of Japanese colonialism.[6] However, this study is focused on Min Yŏnghwan’s perception of the international order, a perception that was based on his role as a diplomat.[7]
Min Yŏnghwan served the state as Pyŏngjo p΄ansŏ (兵曹判書, Minister of Defense) on two different occasions in 1888 and 1890, as Hyŏngjo p’ansŏ (刑曹判書, Minister of Punishment) and Hansŏng puyun (漢城府尹, Mayor of the Capital of Chosŏn) in 1893, as the Tokp΄an naemubusa (督判內務府事, Minister of Home Affairs) and Hyŏngjo p’ansŏ in 1894, and Korean ambassador plenipotentiary to the United States in August 1895. Min was appointed as the Korean Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Tsar Nicholas II’s Coronation held in April 1896. After his return to Chosŏn in October, he concurrently held the positions of Ŭijŏngbu ch΄anjŏng (議政府贊政, Official of the Council of State) and Kunbu taesin (軍部大臣, Minister of National Defense). In January 1897, Min was appointed as Korean Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to England, Germany, Russia, France, Italy, and Austria, during which time he participated in Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee.
Upon his return from his voyages to Russia and England in 1896-97, Min Yŏnghwan wrote various books such as <Ch΄ŏnilch΄aek (千一策)>, <Haech΄ŏn ch΄ubŏm (海天秋帆)>, and <Sagu sokch΄o (使歐續草>. In the <Ch΄ŏnilch΄aek>, Min, analyzing the international political situation which surrounded Chosŏn at that time, introduced detailed countermeasures which in accordance with his perception of this international environment, Chosŏn should pursue. Identifying Russia, Japan, and China as the powers which threatened Chosŏn’s political reality, Min suggested the diplomatic course that should be taken toward these countries in the introductory section of the <Ch΄ŏnilch΄aek>. In this regard, he had the following to say about Russia:
In addition, this country has a custom of placing a high value on invading other states like an eagle does to its prey, and of adopting the eagle as the emblem for its flags. Russia has now stationed its fleet in Vladivostok and constructed a railroad that goes all the way to the Amur River. This means that it has in essence already established its left wing. If Russia also completes the Siberian railway, then we can consider that Russia has also established it right wing as well. When this comes to pass, Russia will be able to threaten each East Asian nation’s strategic sites. Can it thus not be said that the East Asian countries find themselves right under the fangs of this eagle?[8]
Min Yŏnghwan then delved into Russia’s military power and aggressive foreign policy before raising the crisis that would engulf the international political situation in East Asia once the Siberian railroad was completed. Min’s perception of the international situation is similar to the one spelled out in Japanese Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo’s speech, <Diplomatic Political Strategies> before the Diet in 1890.[9] Meanwhile, in terms of Japanese political trends, Min argued that Russia’s political actions had served as the impetus for Japan’s establishment of its own more aggressive policy of encroachment toward Chosŏn.[10]
Min’s conclusion following his comparison of Chosŏn and Japan’s state power in the aftermath of the Meiji Restoration that the internal disturbances which rocked Chosŏn during this period were directly related to Japan’s intention to invade Chosŏn. As far as China was concerned, Min went to great lengths, given Korea’s status as a vassal state of China from a diplomatic standpoint, to stress the importance of securing the diplomatic support of China. However, this diplomatic support from China, Min believed, should involve the latter’s support for the continuous implementation of a policy designed to strengthen Chosŏn’s military.
In addition, in his musings on China’s policy toward Chosŏn, Min also made mention of the <Ch’ao-hsien t’se-lüeh> written by Huang Tsun-hsien in 1880. However, unlike what was argued in the <Ch’ao-hsien t’se-lüeh>. Min pointed out that Chosŏn could not expect to receive the unilateral support of China. In terms of the nature of the ongoing changes in the international political situation, Min stressed the fact that the current domestic political changes in China, including the possibility of a change in Li Hungchang’s political status, were closely related to the situation in Chosŏn.[11]
In addition to the 10 measures which should be taken to defend Chosŏn introduced in his <Ch΄ŏnilch΄aek>, Min also advocated that Chosŏn adopt the following diplomatic course toward its neighbors:
The nature of the current political situation renders it necessary for Chosŏn, a country which is located in the Far East, to establish a relationship with China that is as close as that between lips and teeth. Should Japan attempt to invade us, we shall, in coordination with China, secretly use Russia to counter Japan’s actions. Should Russia attempt to invade us, then we shall, again in coordination with China, secretly use Germany to counter Russia’s actions. Although Chosŏn is located between China, Russia, and Japan, as China is like a brother’s house, we will have measures at our disposal to deter any Russian or Japanese invasion if we establish such strategies. Furthermore, as China is these days also wary of a Russian invasion, it has been busy fomenting close ties with Germany and English. Our own preparations against foreign aggression should also include the forging of such ties with these countries. When viewed from this standpoint, it becomes evident what course of action is advantageous to us and which one is not.[12]
The Tongnip sinmun’s Perception of Russia.
While the Tongnip hyŏphoe (獨立協會, Independence Club) emerged as the leading force for reform at the private level during the Taehan Empire, the Tongnip sinmun (獨立新聞, The Independent) can be said to have reflected the ideological leanings of the members of this Tongnip hyŏphoe. The Tongnip sinmun was the first newspaper published for regular Korean people. The exclusive use of Korean characters has widely been regarded as one of the main reasons why this paper was able to become influential in a relatively short period of time. The Tongnip sinmun clearly illustrates the change in the public opinion of Russia which began to take place following King Kojong’s return from the Russian Legation.
As mentioned above, the Chosŏn government dispatched royal envoys to Tsar Nicholas II’s Coronation, with Min Yŏnghwan serving as the Korean Minister Plenipotentiary, an event that took place during the period in which King Kojong’s was interned in the Russian Legation. In this regard, the Tongnip sinmun perceived this dispatch of royal envoys to Russia as a step that would heighten the domestic and international status of Chosŏn. In addition, the paper also looked positively upon the Chosŏn government’s request that Russia dispatch troops in order to suppress anti-government forces within Chosŏn.[13]
Moreover, the Tongnip sinmun argued that Japanese newspapers’ criticism of Chosŏn’s pro-Russian policy and their explanation of the background to King Kojong’s flight to the Russian Legation were based on inherently flawed arguments.[14] The paper’s friendly disposition toward Russia is also evidenced by the fact that it singled out Japan as the direct cause of King Kojong’s flight to the Russian Legation, and by its stressing of the fact that the decision to take such a drastic measure had come from King Kojong himself. This friendly disposition toward Russia began to gradually change following the announcement of the establishment of the Taehan Empire upon King Kojong’s return to the palace, and the subsequent formation of a pro-Russian government that pursued its own reform agenda. The Tongnip hyŏphoe blasted the government’s decision to invite a Russian adviser to effectively administer the state’s finances on the grounds that such an action in essence signaled the abandonment of the rights of an independent state and a step backwards in terms of the implementation of a neutral diplomacy.[15] As such, the Tongnip sinmun perceived Russia as a state which unlike England or Japan, wanted to encroach on the sovereignty of the Taehan Empire. In this regard, the paper used the manner in which the collapse of Poland was brought about to enlighten the general population of Chosŏn about Russia’s true nature. Koreans’ perception of Russia as an expansionist power hell-bent on revoking the independence of the Taehan Empire continued to foment thereafter.
A general reading of the Korean version of the Tongnip sinmun reveals the existence of concrete perceptions of the powers surrounding the Korean peninsula. Thus, while China (Qing) was no longer the suzerain of Chosŏn, it was nevertheless perceived as an unenlightened state that still intended to exercise its influence over Chosŏn. For its part, Japan, which had accepted Western culture and become the first enlightened state in East Asia, was perceived as a good example to be followed when it came to the establishment of a modern reform policy. Meanwhile, the United States and England were perceived as states which, if not from a political standpoint, could help to foster Chosŏn’s independence and enlightenment from an economic and social standpoint. Over time, Russia began to increasingly be singled out for its perceived outlandish demands for economic concessions and extraterritorial settlements (choch΄aji) in Chosŏn.
As we can see from an article entitled <Tongsŏyang hyŏngse> which appeared in the Tongnip sinmun on January 17, 1899, and another named <Kakkukdorak>[16] published on February 27, 1899, Japan was perceived as the first state to have achieved modernization in East Asia, as a source of assistance in preserving Chosŏn’s independence, and as the protector of East Asia from Western encroachment. Meanwhile, Russia was perceived as a state which possessed the territorial ambition of obtaining an ice-free port and as a power to be wary of. For its part, the United States was perceived as the most powerful country in the world, and as the champion of undeveloped states’ independence. England, in the meantime, was perceived as a country that had become an economic powerhouse through trade. In addition, the Tongnip sinmun went to great lengths to report on the alliance forged between the United States, England, and Japan to counter Russia’s perceived southern expansion, and to stress the power of this alliance.
Russia’s sudden emergence as the main target of scorn from the Tongnip sinmun, which proclaimed itself an ardent advocate of the independent defense of national sovereignty and opponent of Russia’s attempts to secure economic advantage in Chosŏn, for the most part can be traced back to Russia’s demand that it be granted the right to lease Chŏlyŏngdo, the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the Russo-Korea Bank, and the dismissal of Russian economic and military advisors. In addition to Russia, Japan also found itself the object of criticism by the Tongnip sinmun for its demand that the base of the coal bin located in Chŏlyŏngdo be returned to it. However, this sudden venom towards Japan was rooted in the attempts to justify the paper’s opposition to Russia’s demand for the lease of Chŏlyŏngdo.[17]
The articles found in the Tongnip sinmun expose the fact that while Koreans had a generally pro-Japanese and pro-United States outlook, they tended to see-Russia in a negative light. The attitude of the Tongnip sinmun can be perceived as having been closely related to the fact that the main faction within the Chosŏn government at that time was the pro-Russian group. In addition, another factor which came into play was that a great majority of the intellectuals who occupied leading roles within the newspaper had been influenced by the United States and Japan.
This reality is also supported by the fact that arguments similar to the ones presented in the Tongnip sinmun as to why they opposed Russia’s policy toward Chosŏn were used to justify the formation of the American-English-Japanese alliance in 1898. As such, the Tongnip sinmun can be perceived as having called on the government to pursue a new diplomatic course that was based on the adoption of a policy of deterring Russia. When we consider the origins of the Korean diplomacy which emerged after the opening of the three ports, it becomes evident that this policy of deterring Russia was deeply rooted in the <Ch’ao-hsien t’se-lüeh> written by Huang Tsun-hsien in 1880, which as mentioned above, advocated the adoption of a deterrence policy towards Russia based on the strategy of maintaining a close friendship with China, treaty ties with Japan, and a diplomatic alliance with the United States.
The Tongnip sinmun’s eventual adoption of a clear view of the international order that was based on a pro-Japan, pro-England, and pro-United States stance on the one hand, and opposition to Russia on the other, can be regarded as one of the main reasons why Korean intellectuals easily became pro-Japanese once the balance of power on the Korean peninsula tilted in favor of Japan in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War. In turn, the pro-Japanese leanings of these intellectuals to some degree contributed to the transition from the era of Residency-General politics to Japan’s eventual annexation of Korea.
* * *
In this study, an attempt was made to analyze the main currents in Koreans’ perceptions of Russia during the transitional period in modern East Asian history that began with the first border encounter between Korea and Russia in 1860. As mentioned above, the Western powers began from the middle of the 19th century onwards to attempt to use gunboat diplomacy to pry open the East Asian nations.
Although Chosŏn found itself subjected to efforts on the part of the Western powers to force it to open its door at much the same time as China and Japan did, it, unlike its two neighbors, maintained an effective closed-door policy until the middle of the 1870s. In this vein, Chosŏn’s first attempts to open up to the Western world came in the 1880s. During this period, China and Japan emphasized to their neighbor that the common threat which all three East Asian states faced was the presence of an expansionist Russia on their doorstep. However, unlike those who held sway within the government, Confucian scholars’ initial perception of Russia can be said to have been an objective one. These Confucian scholars, who regarded all foreign powers as being one and the same, demanded that objective judgments based on the reality of Chosŏn be made.
The period immediately following the Sino-Japanese War has generally been regarded as the point at which Korea began to join the modern international order. The termination of the Sino-Japanese War and subsequent Russian-led Triple Intervention had the effect of greatly increasing Russia’s influence within Chosŏn. Furthermore, this period also saw a flurry of diplomatic activities at the government level, as well as exchanges with the United States, France, Germany, and Russia at the private level. Thus, those who held sway within the government and the newly emerging intellectuals developed generally contradictory perceptions of Russia.
Finally, I would like to conclude this study with a summary of Korean perceptions of Russia during the period revolving around the Russo-Japanese War in which Korea gradually lost its diplomatic independence. Russia’s perceived attempts to establish a military stronghold on the Korean peninsula were heavily criticized at the outset of the 20th century. A comparison articles published during this period with those found in the Tongnip sinmun during the previous period reveals that Koreans still perceived Russia as a power that had territorial ambitions on the Korean peninsula.
From a general standpoint, we can see that Koreans became increasingly concerned about the possibility of a war between Russia and Japan, and the ensuing results of such a war, following the intensification of the political conflicts between Russia and Japan over the Korean peninsula and Manchuria after the Boxer Rebellion of 1898. In this regard, Koreans perceived four potential flashpoints that could lead to war between its two powerful neighbors:
First, Japan had long been hostile toward Russia because of the fact that the latter had entered Manchuria while Japan had been forced as a result of the Russian-led Triple Intervention to abandon its designs on the Liaodong peninsula, which it perceived as its rightful property given its victory in the Sino-Japanese War. Second, Russia had not conformed with Western demands that it withdraw its military from Manchuria. Third, the geopolitical proximity between Manchuria, the Korean peninsula and Japan meant that the latter perceived the advantageous resolution of the Manchurian question as being intricately tied to its own security. Fourth, as Japan’s economy was centered on East Asia, Japan had no choice but to go to war to secure its own economic advantages. As such, Koreans emphasized the fact that the Russo-Japanese War was the result of Russian expansionism rather than of any Japanese provocations.
In addition, a new viewpoint as to why a war between Russia and Japan was inevitable also began to emerge during this period. This new approach depicted a war between Russia and Japan as one which was designed to ensure the security of all East Asia or as a war between the Caucasian and Oriental races. In this regard, one can find numerous examples in the local papers and magazines published during the war in which the Russo-Japanese War is depicted as a war between the Caucasian and Oriental races. Thus, as the war was perceived as a clash of civilizations, the Russo-Japanese War was in effect viewed as a moral war designed to avert the destruction of the Oriental race. In this regard, once the Russo-Japanese War was perceived as a war between the Caucasian and Oriental races, Chosŏn, which belonged to the Oriental race, naturally began to not only view the war from the standpoint of Japan, but to eventually seek to collaborate with it.
[1] The term, ‘Korea: The Hermit Nation’, originated from William E. Griffis’, Corea: The Hermit Nation (New York; C. Scribner’s sons), 1882.
[2] Choi Deok soo, Opening of the Three Ports and Chosŏn-Japan Relations (Kaehanggwa choil kwan΄gye), Korea University Press, 2004, p. 4.
[3] Translated by Song Pyŏnggi, Opening and Subordination (Kaebanggwa yesok), Tan΄guk University Press, 2000, p. 48.
[4] Kojong sillok (高宗實錄), February 26 of the 18th year of King Kojong.
[5] Choi Deok soo, The International Environment Surrounding the Taehan Empire (Taehan chegukkwa kukche hwan΄gyŏng), Sŏnin, 2005, p. 40.
[6] For more on the claim that Min Yŏnghwan’s death served as the decisive factor in the formation of modern Korean nationalism, please see Andre Schmid, Korea Between Empires: 1895-1919, Columbia University Press, 2002, pp. 142-145.
[7] Michael Finch, Min Yŏnghwan: A Political Biography, University of Hawaii Press, 2002.
[8] Translated by Yi Minsu, Min Honggi ed., Min ch΄ungjŏnggong yugo, Ilchogak, 2000, p. 70.
[9] Yamagata Aritomo, “Diplomatic Political Strategies”, March 1890, The Opinions of Yamagata Aritomo, pp. 196-200.
[10] Min ch΄ungjŏnggong yugo, p. 71.
[11] Min ch΄ungjŏnggong yugo, p. 73.
[12] Ibid, pp. 107-108.
[13] Tongnip sinmun (독립신문), October 24, 1896.
[14] Tongnip sinmun, November 5, 1896.
[15] Tongnip sinmun, November 18, 1897.
[16] Tongnip sinmun, January 17, 1899.
[17] Chŏnggyo(鄭喬), Taehan kyenyŏnsa (大韓季年史) I, p. 179.
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