Ким Вонсу (Kim Wonsoo),
Cеульский Национальный педагогический университет
The rivalry over the Korean peninsula, and the so-called ‘Korean problem’ were in reality as much the tinderboxes from which the Russo-Japanese War ignited as the rivalry over Manchuria. Korean problem has originated with the Seoul-Ŭiju (Kyŏngŭi) Railway and the Yalu timber concessions. And it eventually led to the Russo- Japanese rivalry around the Yongampo Incident happened in the Korean bank of the Yalu River between February, 1903 and February, 1904.
The Yongampo Incident has been known as the term “the Yalu Issue” or “Yalu crisis” in abroad, did not occur in isolation. It has various accidents involved; the Japanese acquisition of the Seoul-Ŭiju Railway concession right, the exploitation of the Yalu timber concession, Russia’s lease of Yongampo, The opening of Ŭiju and Yongampo etc.[1] And It is a well- known fact that this has been widely regarded by scholars as the immediate cause of war.[2]
Nevertheless, a century later there continues to be few debates either domestically or internationally over which party should bear responsible for the war and the war’s origins, at least as far as it pertains to Korea.[3] It would be a wrong way to go the history involved its interpretation of the origins and characteristics of the Russo-Japanese War.
In this study, I try to reconsider the immediate cause of war based on the Korean historical standpoint. I especially refocus on the role that a series of events in the Korean peninsula in 1903. These include the competition for the concession rights for the construction of the Seoul-Ŭiju Railway; the lease of Yongampo; and the opening of Ŭiju and Yongampo in the Yalu frontier.
Why reconsider the Korean problem in the cause of the War.
The Russo-Japanese War has been regarded as one of the most important factor for the understanding of early Twentieth Century international relations in the Far East. Yet, the nature of the Russo-Japanese War has not been successfully clarified because of the ambiguity of the cause of war.
Among the interpretation of the causes of war, two influential theories have prevailed. The first is the “traditional interpretation” and the second the “traditional Russian interpretation”. The first is represented by the work of Kanichi Asakawa.[4] In his work, he concluded that unbridled Russian imperialism, not in content with the illegal seizure of Manchuria, extended itself into Korea in the guise of a private enterprise around the Yalu timber concession. The second is first advocated by General A. N. Kuropatkin to justify his failure in battle[5]; it was later documented by B. B. Glinskii.[6] He pointed out the Russian scheme for secret penetration of Korea and assigned the responsibility for this imperialistic design not to the Triumvirate but to the Bezobrazov Circle.[7]
These two interpretations are basically identical. Both considered that the Russian policy toward Korea was imperialistic and aggressive, and that the Russian activity toward Korea drove Japan into war. In analyzing the Russian policy toward Korea, these researchers have focused their attention on the Yalu timber concession, and interpreted the initiation of exploitation of the concession as a sign of the Russian intent to incorporate Northern Korea into the Russian sphere of influence. These two theories persisted until late 1950’s.
But in 1958 Malozemoff re-evaluated the role of the governmental figures responsible for the Russian Far Eastern policy and assigned a new role to the Yalu timber concession in his doctoral dissertation[8]. He introduced the revised view that Russia had conceded Japan’s primacy in Korea and since Russia had ruled out governmental aid to the Russian timber concessions, the actual exploitation of the concession had not played an important role in the dispute between Russia and Japan. From this point of view, he came to conclusion that the Yalu concession, which had long been considered to be a focus of the Russo-Japanese controversy over Korea, had little significance in the course of the negotiations immediately before the outbreak of the war. However, his research was to be limited because of the fact that he did not utilize Japanese source material.
After that, The Study of the Nagoya Group leaded by Shinobu Seisaburo and Nakayama Jiichi, revealed that the Japanese government decided to enter negotiation with Russia in October, 1903 because of intensified Russian activities in Northern Korea. They assumed that Russia had been engaged in the expansion of her sphere of influence. But they also did not investigate the Yalu concession through Japanese source material.[9]
In 1963, Takamitsu Sugawara was attempted to make up for such defects in source materials.[10] His research was undertaken to trace the reactions of the Japanese government to the Russian development of the Yalu concession in order to evaluate the role of the Yalu issue in the cause of the Russo-Japanese war. It was based primarily on the Japanese documentary materials.
He introduced that the Yalu Issue was one reason of the confrontation between Russia and Japan on the question of further expansion of Russian political and economic interests in Korea, and that The Russian activities revolving about timber concessions were considered by Japan to seriously endanger Japan’s paramountcy of interest in Korea. However, He advised that The Yalu controversy did not occur in isolation, and that the various factor involved in this issue must be understood in the context of the fairly long process of Russian political ascendancy in Korea.
In this point of view, he examined everything involved in Yalu Issue: the Yongampo settlement, the Treaty for the Lease of Yongampo and the Opening of Uiju. But he failed to notice the importance of Korean railway concession. In Conclusion, in contrary to Malozemoff’s Interpretation, he viewed that the Yalu Issue having played a basic role in the development of antagonism between Russia and Japan.
Thereafter, so many works related to the cause of war have been published up to recently.[11] However, As you see, Several limitation have emerged with regard to the above studies on the cause of war. Such studies carried out by former scholars have tended to run in a parallel fashion until this time. Moreover, scholars from other countries have also had their ability to formulate objective analyses of this question severely limited by the fact that they have had to rely on either Russian or Japanese sources to conduct their studies.
Furthermore, Although scholars have stressed that the Russo-Japanese rivalry in the Yalu Issue was the main cause of the Russo-Japanese War, the majority of the studies conducted on that issue, both domestically and abroad, have almost exclusively focused not on the Japanese activities in Korea, but Russian activities in Manchuria and Korea. Therefore, such Studies on the causes of the War also have naturally tended to overlook the role of Korean affairs and only focused on Manchuria affairs. Like this, those studies have left out the korean problem in the discussion. In other words, no in-depth studies of the role of Korean problem in the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War have been conducted.[12]
This is the one reason why the competition for the concession rights for the construction of the Seoul-Ŭiju Railway; the lease of Yongampo port; and the Opening of Ŭiju and Yongampo must have been analyzed in-depth in this time.
On the other side, another reason existed. It’s related to the Japanese distortion of history. Since 1982, one of the most common Japanese distortions contained in history textbooks revolves around the origins and nature of the Russo-Japanese War. The essence of their distortions is that: Facing with Russia‘s southward expansion to Korea, Japan had no choice but to go to war once negotiations with Russia broke down.[13]
The problem is that this Interpretation of the Russo-Japanese War as stemming from Russia’s actions represents an attempt by Japan to shift responsibility for the outbreak of the war from itself to Russia. Such an Interpretation is intended to prove that Russia’s military operations in Yalu area in 1903 is a clue to the war; thus, Japan’s intention is to place the blame for the Russo-Japanese War on Russia’s aggressive policy from Manchuria to Northern Korea.
In the case of Korean History, Japanese distortions become even more serious problems. Researches deal with the issues of the Masanpo and Yongampo incidents as being part of the so-called ‘Korean problem’ that eventually led to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. Moreover, such Researches have tended to describe these two incidents as having been caused by Russia’s aggressive policies, policies to which Japan had no choice but to respond with the kind of force that led to the Russo-Japanese War.[14]
But Such an Interpretation is different from Historical fact in the viewpoint of Korean Modern History. Here I would like to make it clear that Korean academia has plainly spelled out its position on the Russo-Japanese War in the middle of the 1980’s, a position which can be summarized as follows:
“The claim that the Russo-Japanese War was a conflict that originated from attempts to stem Russian encroachment on the Korean peninsula and preserve the independence of Korea is based on Japan’s attempts to distort history in order to justify its colonization of Korea…. Such claims serve as the basis of Japan’s self-righteousness, which is well reflected in their description of Russia’s ‘aggressive acts’ towards the Korean peninsula at the beginning of the 20th century, including their seizure of the land surrounding the Masanpo and Yongampo areas, their building of various facilities in these areas, their stationing of a select number of troops there, as well as their aggressive pursuit of timber concessions in the Yalu River area, as the proof of Russia’s designs in Korea. However, such assertions represent nothing more than outright lies that are not supported by actual facts. Moreover, there exists little proof to support the assertion regarding Russia’s colonial ambitions in Korea.”[15]
Nevertheless, Even recent studies conducted on the origins of this conflict, both domestically and abroad, have almost inclined to focus on the role of Manchuria.
This is the main reason why this writer has asserted that the time has come to reconsider the study of the Russo-Japanese War from the standpoint of Korean history, especially as it pertains to the background and causes of this war.
Rethinking the Yongampo Incident. [16]
While Russia carried out the 1st stage of the withdrawal of Russian troops in Manchuria without no guarantees in October, 1902, the Japanese Cabinet agreed to decide the plan to construct Seoul-Uiju railway and connect Manchurian railway with this. To promote this plan, the Foreign Minister Komura and the Japanese minister in Seoul, Hayashi Gonsuke attempted to acquire the Seoul-Uiju railway concession. However, Against this measure, Russian Legation in Korea took counter-measure by asking railway concession and exploiting Yalu timber concession.[17]
In this situation, Early 1903, there seemed to be signs of a new Russo-Japanese Rivalry in northern Korea. As the rivalry developed its effect was felt unexpected quarters. And it eventually led to the non-fulfillment of the 2nd stage of the withdrawal of Russian troops in Manchuria and furthermore, the Yongampo Incident. In April and May, Russian settlements were established at Yongampo. And from June, Russo-Korean negotiation on the lease treaty for Yongampo made a start. Against these Russian activities in Korea, Japanese foreign ministry and Japanese legation in Korea took active counter measures; One was to acquire the railway concession and construct railway by its own ability. Another was to open the Uiju and Yongampo with the diplomatic support of the foreign ministers in Korea like Jordan. A different measure was to prevent from negotiating on the lease treaty for Yongampo between Korea and Russia. The former was accomplished, but the second followed out immediately the outbreak of war by Japan. And the latter has remained unsolved.[18]
As mentioned above, the Yongampo incident happened in the Korean bank of the Yalu River was the crucial issue on the eve of the Russo-Japanese war. Nevertheless, Even so many studies treated on the causes of war have tended the focus of the role of Manchuria. However, this kind of approach involving the chronicling of events happened in Manchuria and Korea leading up to the war reveals problems with this practice of focusing on Manchuria as the cause of the war.
The reason why is that during the 18 months between the 1st stage of the agreement with China to evacuate its troops from Manchuria signed in April 1902 and its refusal to carry out the 3rd and final stage of this agreement in October 1903, the conflict between Russia and Japan over Manchuria enjoyed a lull of sorts; however, the Korean peninsula was an entirely different matter, a fact which scholars have tended to overlook.[19] Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of the actual causes of the Russo-Japanese War should include an in-depth examination of the Yongampo Incident which unfolded in Korea during this period as well.
Of course, there have been a wide range of studies that have dealt with the issue of the Russo-Japanese rivalry in Korea ; however, in this case as well, no comprehensive study linking together the series of events which unfolded on the Korean peninsula during this period have been carried out. For example, while certain studies have dealt with one or another of these issues, such as the rivalry over the securing of the Seoul-Ŭiju Railway concession [20], the Yongampo Incident[21], and the opening of Ŭiju[22], these have failed to link these incidents to the wider chain of events unfolding in Korea at that time.
A synthetic approach to the events happened in Korea before the war, namely, the rivalry over the securing of the Seoul-Ŭiju Railway concession rights, the lease of Yongampo, and the opening of Ŭiju, clearly illustrates how the Korean affairs were directly related to the actual outbreak of the war.[23] The acquisition of the Seoul-Ŭiju Railway concession rights was perceived as the key to the control of northern Korea and Manchuria as it ran all the way to the Manchurian border, and as the subject of a heated rivalry between the warring states who saw this as a chance to open up Korea under their own auspices. As such, Japan’s prior attempts to secure this concession for itself was met with firm opposition from the Russian side who also wanted to acquire this right, which led Russia to put in motion its own step-by-step plan to gain control of Korea and the rights to the Seoul-Ŭiju Railway, a plan that included the exploitation of timber concessions in the Yalu River area[24], the seizure of the Yongampo area, and their encroachment into Ŭiju as well.[25]
In short, the Yongampo Incident, which has been widely regarded by scholars as the fuse that set off the Russo-Japanese conflagration, was Russia’s only possible response to Japan’s efforts to expand its influence into northern Korea and Manchuria by linking the Seoul-Ŭiju Railway to the Chinese Eastern Railway following the 1st stage of the withdrawal of Russian troops, a withdrawal which was not rewarded with the promised guarantees. Therefore, when we consider the facts that led up to Russia and Japan coming into conflict with one another in northern Korea, it becomes evident that although both parties should shoulder some of the responsibility for the outbreak of the war, it is Japan, and not Russia as previously thought, that must bear the lion’s share of the blame because it was the one who orchestrated the events that set off the war.[26]
In other words, Russia’s response to Japan’s attempts to expand its influence in northern Korea, by seizing Yongampo and Ŭiju under the cloak of protecting their Yalu timber concessions, was an ex post facto measure. Moreover, Russia’s new course, exemplified by its seizure of Yongampo, can also be seen as a response to Japanese foreign minister Komura Jutaro’s new more aggressive approach to securing the Seoul-Ŭiju Railway concession rights . Therefore, previous studies’ tendency to describe the Yongampo Incident as stemming from Russia’s aggressive policy towards Manchuria and Korea, and as having been the result of Russia’s naked aggression of Yongampo, needs to be reanalyzed.[27]
Based on the above historical facts, Russia’s attempts to seize Yongampo can rightfully be seen as the response of an actor who had its back up against the wall, and as an attempt to stem the Japanese from getting their hands on Ŭiju, which represented the last stop on the Seoul-Ŭiju Railway. As such, the actual objective of both nations was in fact not really Yongampo, but Ŭiju. While Tyler Dennett stressed that after 1898 the Korean peninsula ceased to be an object of rivalry between Russia and Japan, it should be clear that the final objective of both sides was in fact the Korean city of Ŭiju.[28] As such, Manchuria was not the only source of conflict between these two countries as Korea was also a sticking point between the two during the period leading up to the war. Thus, a new assessment of the role of the railway concession issue and of the opening of ports in northern Korea in the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War should be undertaken.[29]
However, the Yongampo Incident, regarded as the core of the Korean problem, should not be perceived as being solely related to the interpretation of the causes of the Russo-Japanese War. This is because the Yongampo Incident affected not only the flow of Korean and Northeast Asian history, but world history as well.
By 1903, this Russo-Japanese rivalry over the Yongampo Incident in Korea, exemplified by the Japanese acquisition of the Seoul-Ŭiju Railway concession right, Russia’s lease of Yongampo, The opening of Ŭiju and Yongampo ; as well as the interest of other foreign powers in this rivalry, were events whose influence extended well beyond the Korean peninsula and Manchuria. These events, which had already moved beyond the regional East Asian level as well, in effect pitted world powers against one another, with each party trying to gain supremacy amidst the new world system which began to take shape at the beginning of the 20th century.[30]
This argument is supported by the fact that Roosevelt’s adoption of a pro-Japanese and anti-Russian diplomatic platform, Edward VII and French President Loubet’s exchange of visits marking the onset of the Anglo-French Entente Cordial of 1904 and the Russian led Tripartite Intervention all occurred during the same timeframe in which the Yongampo Incident unfolded. In other words, the situation on the Korean peninsula during this period was a part of the developing diplomatic struggle at the global level, with the Korean peninsula being at the center of these changes in the world diplomatic structure.[31]
Thus, the rivalry which emerged over the control of the northern part of the Korean peninsula, which began with the issue of securing concession rights for the construction of the Seoul-Ŭiju Railway but expanded to include the Yongampo incident and the opening of Ŭiju and Yongampo, does not represent a simple episode which originated between the conflict between Russia and Japan. The fact that these events led directly to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, and eventually resulted in providing Japan with the opportunity not only to annex Korea but also penetrate Manchuria, means that they should be perceived as important historical incidents on a scale similar to the Morocco Crisis which eventually resulted in the advent of World War I. [32]
Moreover, these incidents can be perceived as the direct precursors of the eventual crises which engulfed East Asia. This is the reason why the ‘Korean problem’ was important enough to result in the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, which has been referred to as a mini-World War,[33] and why the Yongampo Incidents which emerged on the Korean peninsula 100 years ago should be reanalyzed not only at the Korean history level but at the level of world history.
As mentioned above, I am of the mindset that the limitations of the arguments put forward by previous Japanese and Russian researchers with regards to the cause of the war can be overcome when further emphasis is placed on the Korean problem, especially the Yongampo Incident. The reason why is that the Yongampo Incident holds the Key to the solution of the question.
* * *
100 years have past since the Russo-Japanese War. At this point in time we must reexamine the war from today’s perspective. The previous researches must be complemented as they leave out Korean problem in discussion. The core of Korean problem was the Yongampo Incident. And it eventually led to the outbreak of the war, and furthermore, resulted in Japanese annexation of Korea but also penetration of Manchuria.
Seen from the present standpoint, Korea was neither an assistant, actor, staff, member of the audience, or even a simple extra in the Russo-Japanese drama that unfolded 100 years ago. This utterly absurd situation has made it so that the time has come for Korea to delve into the questions of on whose behalf the war was fought and for what. In order to do so, studies on the Russo-Japanese War should be carried out from diverse standpoints that include Manchuria and the Korean peninsula, but also incorporate the global policies which emerged during the early period of the 20th century. This kind of approach is needed to develop a comprehensive understanding of the characteristics of the Russo-Japanese War. To achieve this, first of all, more efforts should be put into uncovering the actual nature of the incidents which unfolded on the Korean peninsula during the period surrounding the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War.
[1] Kim Wonsoo, Reconsidering the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War- With a special focus on the Yongampo incident and the opening of Ŭiju (Rŏ•Il chŏnjaengŭi wŏnine Taehan chaekŏmt΄o-Yongampo sakŏnkwa Ŭijukaesirŭl chungsimŭro) , PhD Dissertation, Hanyang University, 1997, (hereafter referred to as Reconsidering the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War)
[2] As an example, Kurobane Sigeru pointed that the immediate causes of the Russo-Japanes War were the following accidents, exemplified by the assassination of the korean Empress, The Boxer Rebellion, The Masanpo Incident ,and Yongampo Incident. In his work, Nichi-Ro Senso Shiron, Tokyo, 1982, pp.105-118.
[3] For a survey of recent work, please refer to John W. Steinberg, et al, The Russo-Japanese war in global perspective: World War Zero, Brill Academic Publishers, 2005; Russo-Japanese War Association(ed), New Perspectives of the study of the Russo-Japanese War, Seibunsa, 2005; Gunji shigakkukai(ed), The Russo- Japanese War (2) – Aspects and Legacies of the War-, Kinseisha, 2005; Gunji shigakkukai (ed), The Russo- Japanese War(1) – International Context-, Kinseisha, 2004.
[4] Kanichi Asakawa, The Russo- Japanese Confict, Boston, 1904.
[5] A.N.Kuropatkin, the Russian Army and the Japanese War, 2 vols, London, 1909.
[6] B.B. Glinskii, Prolog Russko-Iaponskoi Voiny. Petrograd, 1916.
[7] The debates on the Interpretation of the Russian East Asian policy related to the Russo-Japanese War were able to find the brillant works of Pokrovskii, Romanov, Anan’ich and Ignatiev. For the details , see Choi Dukkui, “Russian Historical Understanding on the Russo-Japanese War” in Kang Mankil., (eds), The Comparative Study of the Historical Understanding around the Modern East Asia, SunIn, 2004, pp. 437-470.
[8] Andrew Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy,1881-1904, Berkeley, 1958.
[9] Nakayama Jiichi and Shinobu Seisaburo, Nichi-Ro Senso no Kenkyu, Tokyo, 1959.
[10] Takamitsu Suguwara, Japanese Interests in Korea and the Yalu Issue, 1903-1904, Masters Thesis, Hawaii University, 1963.
[11] For some noticeable examples, John .A. White, The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War, Princeton, 1964; William L. Langer, ‘The origins of the Russo-Japanese War’ in C.E. and E. Schorske (eds), Explorations in Crisis ; Papers on the International History, Cambridge ,Mass, 1969 ; Ian Nish, The origins of the Russo-Japanese war, Longman,1985; Chiharu Inaba, Abakadeta Kaisen no shinjitu : Nichiro senso(Truth of the Outbreak of the Russo- Japanese War.TokyoToyo shoten, 2002 ; Ian Nish, ‘Stretching out to the Yalu :A Contested Frontier,1900-1903’ in John W. Steinberg, et al, the Russo-Japanese war in global perspective: World War Zero, Brill Academic Publishers , 2005; David Schimmelpennick van der Oye, ‘The Immidiate Origins of the War’ in to John W. Steinberg, et al, Ibid.,
[12] For a survey of recent work, please refer to Kim Wonsoo, Reconsidering the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War).
[13] Yi Wŏnsun and Chŏng Chaechŏng, The Problems with Japan’s History Textbooks (Ilbon kyokwasŏ, muŏtsi munjeinka), Dongbang Media, 2002, pp. 400-405.
[14] For more on this subject, please refer to Kim Wonsoo, “ The study of the Russo-Japanese War in Korea and future tasks for history education”, History Education, Vol.90, Association of Korean History Education, 2004.
[15] Pak Chunkyu, The History of International Politics as it Pertains to the Korean Peninsula (Hanbando kukche chŏngch΄isaron), Publishing Department of Seoul National University, 1986, pp. 172-173.
[16] This part is revised and condensed the third chapter of my article, “ The Trends in the study of the Russo-Japanese War in Korea and future tasks ”, International Journal of Korean History , Vol.7, Center for Korean History , 2005, pp. 9-17.
[17] For more the detailed, see Kim Wonsoo, “Japan’s attempts to acquire the concession rights for the construction of the Seoul-Ŭiju Railway and the Yongampo Incident”, The History of Korea-Japan Relations, Vol. 9, Korea-Japan Historical Society, 1998, pp. 52-66.
[18] For a survey , please refer to Kim Wonsoo, Reconsidering the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War)
[19] Kim Wonsoo, Reconsidering the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War, p.3.
[20] For more on this subject, Inoue Yuichi, “KyungUi detsdou no gensetso mekuru Kogusai mondai – Nichiro senso gaidden genin do sideno detsdou mondai(International relations as viewed through the struggle for the concession rights to the Seoul-Ŭiju Railway- One of the main causes of the Russo-Japanese War)”, Kokusai seiji, Vol. 71, The Japan Association of International Relations, 1982, pp173-188 ; Chŏng Chaechŏng, “The construction of the Seoul-Ŭiju Railway and Japan’s attempts to control Korea’s railway policy”, A Compilation of Essays Published by Korea Open University, Vol. 3, Korea Open University, November 1984; Moriyama Shigenori, Kindai Nikan gangei Kenkui (Modern Japanese-Korean Relations), Tokyo daigaku shuppanbu, 1987, Chapter 2 “Chosen detsdou busetsgen gakudoku geikaku (Japan’s attempts to acquire the concession rights for the construction of Korean railways)” ; Kim Wonsoo, “Japan’s attempts to acquire the concession rights for the construction of the Seoul-Ŭiju Railway and the Yongampo incident”, The History of Korea-Japan Relations, Vol. 9, Korea-Japan Historical Society, 1998.
[21] For more on this subject, Takamitsu Suguwara, op.cit.; Oyama Azusa, ‘Yongampo incident’ in Meiji bungai kenkui,vol3, 1969 ; Kim Wonsoo, “The Yongampo incident and Japan’s response” The Japanese Aggression of Korea Before and After the Russo-Japanese War, the Korean Historical Association, 1986;Kim Wonsoo, “Japan and Russia’s approaches to the negotiations over the Yongampo lease rights (Yongampo choch΄a kyosŏpŭl tulŏssan rŏ•ilŭi taehan chŏnch΄aek)”, Compilation of Essays Published by Seoul National University of Education, Vol. 24; Kim Soryŏng, The Taehan Empire’s Perception of and Response to the Yongampo incident (Yongampo sakŏne taehan Taehan chekukŭi wilki ŭisikkwa taeŭng), Masters Thesis, Korea University, 2001.
[22] For more on this subject , Son Chŏngmok, “The opening of ports in Yongampo , Ŭiju, SinŬiju and Chŏngjin- A cross-section of the urbanization of the Taehan Empire (Yongampo , Ŭiju, SinŬiju, Chŏngjin kaehang- kuhanmal tosihwa kwachŏngŭi handanmyŏn)”, Compilation of Essays Published by Seoul National University of Technology, Vol. 11, Seoul National University of Technology, 1977; Kim Wonsoo, “The Russo-Japanese Rivalry over the opening of Ŭiju- One of the main causes of the Russo-Japanese War” Compilation of Essays Published by Seoul National University of Education, Vol. 20, Seoul National University of Education, 1987.
[23] Kim Wonsoo, Reconsidering the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War, p. 3.
[24] For more on this subject, Kang Yŏngsim, “ Russia’s acquisition of the timber concession rights and the deforesting activities conducted by Russian companies at the end of the Taehan Empire”, Ewha Historical Studies, Vol. 17,18, 1988 ; Kim Wonsoo, “ Russia’s plan for its timber concessions on the Yalu River” Susŏnsahoe, Vol. 9, The History Education Department of Seoul National University of Education, 1998; Ch΄oe Tŏkkyu, Russo-Taehan relations (1896-1906): With a special focus on Russia’s attempts to secure timber concessions in order to implement its Yalu River development plan”, Russo-Korean Relations, The Institute for Far Eeastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 1999; Naoki Kanno, ‘Yalu Forest concession and the Japanese Army’ in: Gunji shigakkukai(ed), The Russo- Japanese War(1) – Internatinal Context-, Kinseisha, 2004.
[25] Kim Wonsoo, “Japan’s attempts to acquire the concession rights for the construction of the Seoul-Ŭiju Railway and the Yongampo incident”, The History of Korea-Japan Relations, Vol. 9, Korea-Japan Historical Society, 1998.
[26] Kim Wonsoo, Reconsidering the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War, pp. 113-115.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Dennett, Tyler, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, New York, Doubleday, Page and Co, 1925
[29] Kim Wonsoo, “The origins of the Russo-Japanese War and the issue of the opening of Ŭiju”, The History of Korea-Japan Relations, Vol.11, Korea-Japan Historical Society, 1999.
[30] Kim Wonsoo, “The East Asian policies of the main powers and Korea: 1898-1903”, Oriental Studies, Vol. 31, Dankook University, Institute of Oriental Studies, 2000, pp. 82-83.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Kim Wonsoo, Reconsidering the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War, II.
[33] For an example, see John W. Steinberg, et al, op.cit. The subtitle of this book is described the Russo-Japanese War as the World War Zero.
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